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Moneta the course of economic history.
Paul Volcker, who held the office of Chairmam of the Federal Reserve Board from
1979-1987, left his mark by adamantly fighting inflation throughout his tenn.
He am 1 filled his role assan inflation f'
to tame the ram nt inflation of the late 1970' s. Then he led the COtmt into
prosperity by implementing an expansionary policy fran mid 1982 tmtil the end
of his tenn still







Known as an adamant inflation fighter and credited with being one of the
greatest leaders of the Federal Reserve System (Smith, 1987, p. #35), Paul Volcker
stepped down fran an eight year term in August of 1987. When President Carter
appointed him in 1979, the econcrny was plagued with double digit inflation,
which presented a certain challenge for the new Chainnan. Similarly, rising
inflation characterized the end of Volcker' s term; however, the rate was minimal
canpared to that' characterizing the onset of his term. During his 1979-1987
term, Volcker did not stick to any strict "dogma" but ''borrowedideas from any
point on the ideological spectrun to justify whatever policy he thought appropriate
for the moment" (Reimer, 1987, p. #30). Which ideas did he borrow fran the
ideological spectrun? How did he fight inflation and inflationary expectations?
First, let us look at the means by which Volcker' s policy was put into
motion - the "Federal Reserve System itself. 'The single most important person,
the Cbainnan, is appointed by the President for a four year term. He also presides
over both the Federal Open Markets Carmittee (FCMC)and the Board of Governors.
The FCMC is considered the more important of the two coomittees because it
controls the level of bank reserves by buying and selling government securities.
This is not its sole responsibility, though; the FOMC also advises on discount
rate levels. The ccmnittee is made up of twelve members, the seven governors
plus five regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents. The Board of Governors
also plays a significan part in the formulation of monetary policy. Made up
of seven members appointed by the President for a fourteen year term, the Board




regulatory operations. Lastly, the Federal Reserve Banks are considered part
of the system. Twelve regional banks, located in praninent cities throughout
the United States, naninally own the Federal Reserve System as a corporation.
However, the Federal Reserve System is technically a publicly awned, independent
government agency.
Now, let us take an in-depth look at the monetary policy of Paul Volcker.
We will start by looking at the actual events in chronological order. These
will be divided into two periods, 1979-1982 (''Monetarist Experiment") and 1983-
1987 ("Expansion"). This will be followed by an analysis of the tenn and, finally,
a sunmary and qualitative evaluation.
II. Chronology of Events
As previously stated, the condition. in which the newly appointed Chainnan
found the econany was not a favorable one. Double digit inflation presented
the greatest challenge to the anti-inflation Volcker.
The first period of 1979-1982 has been coined the ''Monetarist Experiment"
because of Volcker
'
s armouncement of a shift in policy emphasis. One of his
first changes included a "new" attempt to control monetary aggregates instead
of aggregates. Monetarists, as implied by the name, view the money supply as
the prime detenninant in determining the GNP and, therefore, an imnensely important
ingredient in the monetary policy recipe. Milton Friedman, a famous monetarist,
argues that the ''Monetarist Experiment" is a misnaner mainly because of the
Money Interval Annual
turning in rate of change
int Date weeks in M1-B
Peak Oct. 3, 1979
Trough Nov. 28, 197.9 8
-1.4%
Peak Feb. 20, 1980 12 +12.1%
Trough April 30, 1980 10
-11.4%
Peak Nov. 26, 1980 30 +15.0%
Trough Feb. 4, 1981 10
-13.1%
Peak April 22, 1981 11 +23.8%
Trough July 1, 1981 10
-10.6%
Peak Sept. 16, 1981 11 +7.2%
Trough Oct. 28, 1981 6
-5.1%
Peak Jan. 13, 1982 11 +24.6%
Table 1
Source: Friedman (1982, p. #72)
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Fed's consistent failure to hit monetary targets (see Table 1); monetarism
advocates a "steady and predictable rate of monetary growth" (Friedman, 1984,
p. #397) . As demonstrated by Table 1 and Figure 3, the money supply exhibited
significant volatility between 1979 and 1982. According to Friedman, the monetary
volatility was greater from 1979-1982 then any other three year period since
the end of WWII (1984, p. #397).
Volcker's first response to 1979's double digit inflation was increases
in both the discount rate and reserve requirements. This immediately resulted
in the sharpest short tenn interest increase in the history of the Federal Reserve




p. #78). These increases in the discount rate and the reserve requirements
continued, causing a "selective credit squeeze" especially affecting the housing,
business, and consuner sectors. Carter, however, still felt that credit controls
were necessary to reign the credit expansion and induced Volck.er to impose them.
These included: a 6-9/0 limit on bank loan expansion, .a requirement of large
corporations to report all credit use to the Federal Reserve Board, and mandatory
reporting of coornercial paper and offshore borrowing to the Federal Reserve
District Banks (Beman, 1980, p. #37). So far, a 9.6% decline in the GNP had
taken place, and the housing , auto, and bond markets had been "crushed". Inflation
however, had been reduced fran 13-14% at the start of Volcker's tenn to within
the 12-13% range by the end of 1980.
The high interest rates in this period held special significance for the
business sector. The persistently high interest, peaking at a 21.5% prime rate
in 1980 u.S. News and World Report, 1981, p. #87), caused not only a decrease
in consuner credit demand but also an overloading of short tenn corporate debt
(Anderson, 1981, p. #65). Because of the high interest rates, yields on corporate
bonds soared to over 14/0 (Anderson, 1981, p. #65). Consequently, corporations
were effectively "frozen out" of the bond market and forced to rely on carmercial
paper and postpone long tenn financing (Business Week, 1981a, p.#40). Also,
as bond rates remained too high for corporations to retire their long tenn debt,
demand for short tenn business loans. mushroomed and therefore contributed to
the retention of high interest rates (Business Week, 1981b, p. #45). Additionally,
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businesses' needs to finance growing volumes of inventory contributed to this
high demand for credit (Business Week, 1982a, p. #19).
The persistently high interest rates of the period have been blamed
for pushing the econany into a 1981-82 recession. The slunp continued into
1982 for three principle reasons. First, the Fed hesitated to ease up on the
money supply at the risk of appearing to be reinflating the economy due to political
pressure (Time, 1983, p.#41). Second, by midsurrmer of 1981 the stock market
reached its lowest level in two years, and many businesses failed (Time, 1983,
p. #41). Third, fears of international financial collapse contributed to the
depressed state of the econany (Time, 1983, p. #41). Volatile credit markets,
growing concern over the budget deficit, and, once again, growing credit demand
by businesses also helped retain high interest rates (Business Week, 1982a,
p. #19) and thus the continued recession.
In surmary, the ''Monetarist Experiment" period is characterized by tight
monetary policy. High reserve requirements, high credit demand by businesses,
and high discOtmt rates (see Figure 2) contributed to the creation and retention
of high interest. This remained tight for too long, though; it pushed the
CO\.D1try into a slunp by the end of the period (1981-1982). However, Volcker
achieved his goal of deflating the econany;. as shown in Figure 1, inflation
fell from 13.3% in 1979 to 5% in 1982.
Mid-1982, Volcker provided some relief for the econany and began an overall
expansionary policy that lasted \.D1til he stepped down from his post in 1987.




especially the Continental Illinois Bank (Business Week, 1982b, p. #24), a 10.1'70
unemployment rate, and industry's operation at a mere 7(J% capacity (Byron, 1982,
p. #65). To start the loosening of monetary policy in this period, Volcker
cut the discount rate for the first of six times in 1982 (see Figure 2). Also,
tax cuts, although not part of monetary policy, were implemented in July to
help heal the "battered" econany. The econany inmediately responded in a number
of ways; new home and autanobile sectors boaned; the growth rate for Ml (currency
and checking accmmts) increased (see Figure 3); consu:ner borrowing increased
(Fortune, 1983, p.#49); inflation remained low (see Figure 1); corporate profits
increased due to cost-cutting measures taken during the "recession"; the Dow
Jones surged well over 1200 (Business Week, 1983a, p. #30). Surely, the expansion
had surpassed all expectations.
This expansion was too great for Volcker, though. He implemented a slightly
tighter policy both to "nurture" the expansion and to prevent another recession
(Mervosh, 1984, p. #22). He began this slight tightening with a discount rate
boost; this irrrnediately resulted in a drop in M1 (see Figure 3, 1983), slowed
growth in bank reserves, decreased borrowed needs by the Treasury, and a slowing
without ''killing'' the recovery. This is demonstrated by the absence of clear
evidence of a slowdown. In 1984, durable goods orders moderately increased,
strong employment. figures emerged, and danestic autanobile sales reached an
8.6 million rate (Business Week, 1984, p. #22) . There was thus no evidence




to be written off third world debt and the Continental Illinois Bank's failure
effectively precluded the immediate imposition of a contractionary policy.
By year end, interest rates had even fallen sanewhat (see Figure 2). Deflation-
ary and generally prosperous econanic times continued tnltil May of 1985, when
the econcxny once again needed a boost. Volcker responded by allowing the money
supply to grow at a faster pace; by September it was growing at a record rate,
but the econany still remained sluggish (Karmin, 1985, p. #25). By 1986, though,
the econany began to grow at a faster pace (Business Week, 1986, p. #35); a
sharp decrease in oil prices cut costs and prices (Business Week, 1986, p. #35),
and a March cut in the discount rate started the most aggressive drive to lower
interest rates since 1982 (Reimer, 1986a, p. #20). Before year end, however,
a "slow down" decision was made because of recent surges in the value of the
dollar, factory orders, heme sales, and an improved trade balance (Reimer, 1986b,
p. #33).
During Volcker' s last months last months, inflation had started to increase
because of the money supply's. over target growth (see Figure 3), the falling
value of the dollar, and increasing gold prices. This, however, was left to
Alan Greenspan, the newly appointed Chairman.
Briefly, the 1979-1982 ''Monetarist Experiment" was characterized by a tight
policy to curb the high inflation of the late 1970' s. The continual and sustained
increase in the discount rate (see Figure 2) resulted in a continuous decrease
in inflation (see Figure 1). The mid-1982 -1987 "Expansion" period was charac-
terized by falling discount rates (see Figure 2) and a still low inflation rate







and Alan Greenspan was forced to contend with increasing inflation at the onset
of his term.
III. Evaluation
One of the most interesting characteristics of Volcker' stem is the continued
concern over the federal budget deficit. He continually warned of the detrimental
financing of the deficit on both interest rates and the
The continued canpetition of governnent borrowing against
only effectively "crowds out" private investment but also
bids up and sustains interest rates. Volcker continually "refused" to. finance
the budget deficit directly by using accannodating monetary policy but may have
indirectly financed the deficit through the strength of the dollar. When interest
rates are high, an inflow of foreign capital is available to finance the deficit
and at the same time increase our liabilities to foreigners. High interest
rates are the result of tight. monetary policy. So Volcker was faced with the
"dilemna" of internally financing the deficit with accornnadating monetary policy
or externally financing the deficit with tight monetary policy. Clearly not
an easy decision; he could contribute to further "crowding out" of private
investment or contribute to the debtor nation status of the United States.
He made the best choice by making his opposition to the deficit known. According-
ly, the only way to cure the deficit is to completely eliminate it. As long
as government bor)ds carry less risk than private bonds, the deficit will continue
to be financed,and private investment will continue to be "crowded out". Clearly,




Another interesting policy decision of Volcker' s is the shift of emphasis to
trying to control monrtery aggregates instead of interest rates. This caused
the beginning of his tenn to be dubbed the ''Monetarist Experiment" because of
its emphasis on monetary aggregates. Was this rea 11y a good idea, though? As
Table 1 demonstrates, Volcker was tmSucessful in stabilizing the growth of M1-
B, the basic money supply. Further, Ml-B is becaning more and more difficult
to trace due to the popularity of NOWaccOln1ts, SUPER-NOWaccOln1ts, and other
interest bearing checking accOln1ts. Perhaps trying to control interest rates
instead would result in greater stability and success in reaching targets.
IV. Conclusion
Surrrnarizing, Volcker served the Federal Reserve Board well for the purpose
for which he was needed. President Carter appointed him in 1979 to cure the
country's double digit inflation. He remedied the problem well; the 1979 infla-
tion of 13.3% was reduced to 1.1% by 1986 (see Figure 1). Reagan also appointed
Volcker to show his own opposition to inflation.
Over his eight year tenn, Volcker both stopped double digit inflation and
allowed the country to expand without reinflating itself. In this respect,
Volcker's policy succeeded. Targeting monetary aggregates, however, was not
accomplished as shown by Table 1 and Figure 3. In my opinion, pegging interest
rates today proves a more certain task. To do this, however, deficits, which
raise interest rates and keep them high must be eliminated with a balanced budget
bill. This task has been left to the new Chainnan, Alan Greenspan, whose first
difficult task was to deal with the stock market crash of October, 1987.
.
We can only hope that Chairman Greenspan's policies contain the same insight
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